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Toward a More Mature System of International
Commercial Arbitration: The Establishment of
Uniform Rules of Procedure and the
Elimination of the Conflict of Laws
Question
by Arden C. McClelland*
I.

Introduction

The increased use of arbitration provisions in transnational commercial contracts has begun to produce a significant increase in arbitration cases pending world-wide. As acceptance of the arbitration system
has grown and been acknowledged at the international level by governments and their court systems, many practitioners in international law
are nonetheless aware of the fact that the system is still in its infancy
despite the proliferation of its use.
The problem with the system is that it does not produce the predictable results that good business lawyers would like to have available for
their clients. There are a number of reasons for this, some related to the
infancy of the system and others related to the inherent problems caused
by language barriers and national parochialism. Clearly, the growing
pains caused by the recent popularity of the system will be stimuli for
creative remedial steps at the national and international levels. This article focuses on an international approach to modernizing arbitration
procedure and suggests changes at that level to make the arbitration system more successful for both clients and the international community as
a whole.
II.

The Basic Problem

The purported advantages of employing arbitration to resolve disputes arising out of contracts involving international commercial transactions make its use highly desirable. Arbitration can be relatively quick
and inexpensive, and it offers the parties an opportunity to choose or
develop a procedure to resolve disputes that uniquely fits their needs. At
* Senior Partner, McClelland Law Offices, Missoula, Montana; B.S. Business Adminis-

tration 1968, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1972, University of Oregon; International and Comparative Law 1974-1975, University of Paris Facult6 de Droit (Sorbonne);
formerly associated with the Paris office of Surrey & Morse, Washington, D.C.
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the international level it also offers the contracting parties of different
nationalities the advantage of avoiding litigation in national courts of the
opposing party.
Although such advantages make arbitration relatively desirable, certain disadvantages do exist. These drawbacks arise when local conflict of
laws rules, procedures, or public policy doctrines preclude the parties
from arbitrating the dispute in a manner which provides a fair hearing
on the merits pursuant to the parties' choices. Examples of these
problems are all too common.
One instance presenting such potential problems occurred in a dispute between an English and a German firm.' The arbitrator was appointed by an international body according to the agreements between
the parties. The arbitrator, a Swiss national, ordered the arbitration to
take place in Switzerland, a power he had under the parties' agreement.
The dispute between the parties could have been resolved by English
municipal law under both English and German private international
law; only German law, however, would apply under the rules of Swiss
private international law.
It has been suggested that the better rule in such a case is that the
arbitrator should follow the law held in common by the only two legal
systems of which the parties could have been aware at the time of making their agreement. 2 This solution, however, presents difficulties. Suppose that the English party, in order to have English substantive law
applied, requested an English court to order the arbitrator to state the
4
3
question of law for the court's decision. If the court took jurisdiction
and ordered the arbitrator to state the question, and the arbitrator refused to do so, there would be grounds for finding the award invalid in
English courts. There would be no such grounds in German courts since
they are not subject to the case stated system of England.
Other examples which are as confusing and difficult to resolve occur
frequently, and it takes little imagination to see why. Commercial transactions crossing national borders are subject to various systems of legal
I See Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, 14 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 132, 162 (1965).
2 Id.
3 Section 21 of the English Arbitration Act, 14 Geo. 6, c.27 (1956), provides:
1)

An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by the High Court,

state:
a) any question of law arising in the course of the reference; or
b) an award or any part of an award, in the form of a special case for
the decision of the High Court.
4 See International Tank and Pipe S.A.K. v. Kuwait Aviation Fueling Co. K.S.C., [1975]
1 Q.B. 224, in which the court, taking jurisdiction of a dispute between two foreign firms that
had stipulated to English law governing their contract, ordered an extension of time for arbitration to occur by virtue of the authority given the court under section 27 of the English Arbitration Act, even though settlement negotiations were still going on and arbitration had not begun.
The case is thoughtfully analyzed in Smedresman, Conflict ofLaws in InternationalCommeria/Arbitrations. A Survey of Recent Developments, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 263, 270-74 (1977).
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procedures, rules and policies that are often very different in effect and
which can be riddled with vagaries of local practice.
As a result, the lawyer practicing in international commerce is faced
with an almost impossible task when attempting to draft an arbitration
clause which will be most protective of his or her client's interests. Despite decades of significant improvements in the effectiveness of the legal
machinery of transnational commercial transactions, counsel's best efforts may still not anticipate all the potential legal problems. The
problems that remain are due largely to the failure of the international
community to face up completely to the realities of the international
market and make adjustments in policy obviously necessary.
Of course, problems also arise when contracting parties give little
thought to the details of their arbitration clause. They typically will add
an arbitration clause at the last minute, with scant consideration given to
the fact that disputes ultimately may arise and cause the arbitration
clause to come into play. Problems may further arise when their arbitration agreement contains a choice of law clause designating the law of
some neutral forum of which they are completely or substantially
unknowledgeable.
Before discussing the changes that must be made, it will be valuable
to analyze the areas of law that come into play in a typical arbitration
case to determine where reform will be most useful. A better understanding of the character of international arbitration and its needs
should emerge from such an analysis.
III. The Law Affecting The Arbitration Process
Even the best draftsmen of international trade contracts cannot
avoid subsequent problems of interpretation. While many international
commercial agreements are hundreds of pages long, questions relating to
5
the parties' original intent and the performance thereof inevitably arise.
The four basic areas of law affecting the process of arbitration are:
procedural rules governing the actual arbitration; the "law of the proceedings" of the appropriate jurisdiction; the "proper law of the contract;" and applicable conflicts laws. Each is an area the practitioner
must carefully consider in drafting the arbitration provisions in the underlying contract.
A.

ProceduralRules

When a dispute reaches arbitration, some guidance must exist for
5 These questions may concern such matters as whether a carrier is liable for damages to
goods or for delay in their delivery, whether an agent has gone beyond his authority, whether
currency restrictions prevent the paying of an amount due under a contract, or whether a provision relieving the promisor of liability under certain conditions is valid. See Wilner, Determining
the Law of Performance in InternationalCommercial Arbitration." A ComparatieStudy, 19 RUTGERS L.
REV. 646,648 n.4 (1965) (citing G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 248, 249 (6th ed.
1961)).
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carrying out the procedure. Arbitration may be conducted in a variety
of ways, ranging from the strictly formal to the very flexible. Although
not always technically qualifying as "laws," the procedural rules chosen
by the parties or the arbitrators to govern the arbitration are of sufficient
importance to warrant a subsequent overturning of the award in court if
6
they are not followed.
Procedural rules can govern many different matters. Among the
more commonly treated are the arbitrator's general authority over the
proceedings; service of process; procedures for the parties' presenting
their cases, including whether they may do so with depositions instead of
personal appearances by witnesses; the parties' rights of rebuttal and
cross-examination; whether a particular jurisdiction's rules of evidence
must apply or whether flexible rules of evidence may be used; determination of deadlines for submitting briefs and announcing the award; and
the form the award should take. 7 Arbitration associations, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris and the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), are well-known sources of procedural
rules. 8 In addition, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has promulgated arbitration procedural rules
intentionally designed to be used by any organization. 9 The United
States Arbitration Act also provides for some arbitration procedures.10
All the rules of an arbitration association are seldom, if ever,
mandatory on parties opting for the association's rules. In fact, the new
rules of the ICC provide that that the association's rules may be supplemented by any rules chosen by the parties.1 ' The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
has also given the parties' choice of procedural rules considerable impor12
tance.
To the extent that the will of the parties in choosing procedural
rules is honored by courts asked to enforce awards issued pursuant to
arbitrations held under those rules, the international climate is well
6 Article V(l)(d) of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement

of-Foreign Arbitral Awards, done, June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6994, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739, provides
that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if the "arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties .
7 See Ehrenhaft, Efecive Intenational Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.

1191, 1205 (1977).
8 See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBI-

TRATION (1975) [hereinafter cited as ICC RULES] and AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1977).
9 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 71), U.N. Doc. A/31/17

(1960).
10 U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-12, 201-08 (1976).
II Article II of the ICC RULES states:
The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator shall be those resulting
from these Rules and, where these Rules are silent, any rules which the parties
(or, failing them, the arbitrator) may settle, and whether or not reference is
thereby made to a municipal procedural law to be applied to the arbitration.
12 United Nations Convention, supra note 6, art. V(1)(d).
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suited to successful arbitration. This is not always the case, however.
The parties may agree, for instance, that arbitration shall be the exclusive method of resolving disputes which arise under a contract and that
substantive rules of law and the rules of evidence shall not be strictly
.applied during the arbitration proceedings. If their arbitration unexpectedly becomes subject to the laws of England, which provides that English
13
courts cannot be ousted of their jurisdiction to decide questions of law
and that arbitrations shall be governed by the same rules of evidence as
govern the courts, 14 the intentions of the parties have been frustrated.
Besides the lack of predictability in the ultimate use of the chosen procedural rules, there remains the absence of an integrated system of rules
that can be routinely chosen with the confidence that all important aspects of the arbitration process will be adequately addressed. The ICC,
AAA, and UNCITRAL rules all provide a starting point, but none completes the job.
The UNCITRAL rules, for instance, cover many areas in detail,
such as notice of arbitration, 15 appointment of arbitrators, 16 statements
of claim' 7 and defense,' the use of experts, 19 and the form and effect of
the award. 20 However, the rules are painfully lacking in other areas.
Nothing is said as to whether all witnesses must testify in person or
whether affidavits and depositions are acceptable, whether cross-examination of witnesses shall be allowed as of right, whether any kind of prehearing discovery shall be allowed as of right, 21 or what the order of
presentation of the parties' cases at the hearing will be.
If arbitration is to be a truly efficient method of resolving parties'
disputes, it must have a generally recognized procedural format that is
conducive to such efficiency. Some may anticipate resistance to the establishment of the absolute right of cross-examination or to the employment of such "uniquely American" institutions as discovery, but the fact
remains that some guidance is needed. However, in view of the general
trends in international arbitration which have developed 22 there is no
reason to think that the international legal community would be adverse
13 Evans & Ellis, InternationalCommercial Arbitraton." A Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 17,30 (1973) (citing I P. SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 67-

69 (1958)).
14
15
16
17
18

See Cohn, supra note 1, at 153.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 9, art. 3.
Id. arts. 6-8.
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 19.

19 Id. art. 27.
20 Id. art. 32.
21 Id. art. 24(2). This article provides:
The arbitral tribunal may, if/i considers it appropriate, require a party to deliver to
the tribunal and to the other party, within such a period of time as the arbitral
tribunal shall decide, a summary of the documents and other evidence which that
party intends to present in support of the facts in issue set out in his statement of
claim or statement of defense. (Emphasis added).
22 See Section IV(B) infta.
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to some kind of standardization of arbitral procedure, whether
mandatory or only suggested. The use of a comprehensive procedure,
upon which parties could justifiably rely in drafting arbitration clauses,
could only help in effectuating parties' desires.
B

The Law of the Proceedings

The so-called "law of the proceedings" is the area that provides the
greatest potential for effectuating or frustrating both the free will of the
arbitrating parties and the goal of successful arbitration. It thus is the
area that stands in most need of reform among international legal regimes. One scholar distinguishes the law of the proceedings from rules
of procedure, which are "rules to guide the hearings," by defining it as:
the system of law under which the arbitration is held and which determines which institutions and rules may not be disregarded, ie., the legal
system of the country in which the award is considered domestic for purposes of obtaining a confirmation. . . . Thus the "law of the proceedings" is not necessarily that of the place where the arbitration took place.
For purposes of enforcement of an award in a country where it clearly is
not a domestic award, its validity under the law of the proceedings, although not under the legal23system of the site of arbitration, may make

such enforcement possible.
The purported scope of the law of the proceedings varies among the
commentators. 24 The most useful view seems to be that it is the law
which "should govern all aspects of procedure in arbitration, including
the conduct of the arbitrator, and crucially, the extent of judicial super'25
vision of the arbitration.
The importance of this view is that it provides a starting point for
analyzing the fundamental question of whether the law of the proceedings has an "independent existence for conflicts purposes."'26 That this
question causes significant problems in analysis makes it easily understandable that tremendous uncertainties are bound to exist with respect
to the ultimate validity of an arbitral award in court. Full analysis of the
question here is neither practical nor necessary, 2 7 but a summary of key
points will be valuable.
First, that arbitrating parties are generally free to choose the law
governing the proceedings does not seem to be well established. Because
the law of the proceedings deals with such controversial issues as whether
the arbitrator must give reasons for the award, whether the award must
23
24
25

Wilner, supra note 5, at 648-49 n.6.
See Smedresman, supra note 4, at 267-68 for a collection of different attitudes.
Id. at 268.

26 Id.

See id. at 267-91 for an excellent discussion of the issues involved in isolating the
law of the proceedings from the substantive law governing an arbitration agreement's underlying contract. It is apparent that few broad conclusions can be
made, either as to how the law of the proceedings of a case ought to be determined, or as to whether the law of the proceedings ought to be part of the system
of law of the same jurisdiction whose the substantive law controls the underlying
contract.

27
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be based upon substantive rules of law, and to what extent the result of
the arbitration is subject to judicial review, 28 restrictions will exist in
some legal systems as to how much freedom the parties have to control
these issues. For instance, English courts cannot be ousted ofjurisdiction
to decide questions of law, 29 arbitration awards in France must be ac30
companied with statements of the reasons on which they were based,
and in Germany, arbitration agreements must be contained in separate
documents when one of the parties is a "trader of minor status."'3 t Such
laws could easily be significant obstacles to effective arbitration in view
of the provision of the United Nations Convention allowing the refusal of
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award when the arbitration
agreement "is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country
"32
where the award was made ....
Second, the law of the proceedings may not necessarily be the same
as that of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration is held, although the
latter may have been the expectation of the parties. In International Tank
andPipe SA.K. v. Kuwait Aviatbin Fuelling Co. KSC ,3 two Kuwaiti firms
agreed that disputes arising between them would be handled first by an
engineer, with the aggrieved party having the right to take the matter to
arbitration. English law governed the contract. The party losing after an
engineer's resolution of a subsequent dispute sought an extension of time
to invoke arbitration while settlement negotiations were pending, and
consequently petitioned an English court under section 27 of the English
Arbitration Act 34 for the extension. The ICC rules, which the parties
had agreed covered the arbitration, said that the law of procedure was to
be either that chosen by the parties or "the rules of the law of the country
where the arbitrator holds the proceedings." '35 The court of appeal
viewed jurisdiction as properly exercised in the case, finding that section
27 was a "statutory term" of the contract, which thus ought to be gov36
erned by English law.

One thoughtful analysis of this case 37 found disturbing consequences in the court's viewing the issue as one of contract interpretation
because this raises the possibility of judicial supervision over an arbitration even after it has begun in another country and under that country's
legal system. One then wonders what the "conceptual use" of the "law
28

See Wilner, supra note 5, at 649.

29 See Evans & Ellis, supra note 13, at 30 (citing I SANDERS, at 67-69).
30 See id. at 45 (citing I SANDERS, at 55).
31 See id. at 42 (citing I SANDERS, at 39).
32 United Nations Convention, supra note 6, art. V(I)(a).

33 [1975] 1 Q.B. 224.
34 See note 3 supra. Section 27 authorizes a court to extend a contractual time limit according to its discretion.
35 ICC RULES art. 16 (1955). See note 11 supra for the current rules.
36 [1975] 1 Q.B. at 233.
37 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 270-73.
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of the proceeding" is when more than one jurisdiction may properly su38
pervise the same arbitration.
To answer this question, it must first be recognized that where a
transaction has multiple foreign contacts and involves parties of different
nationalities, litigation in several forums is inevitable. An arbitration
agreement may be part of such a case, affecting only certain parties and
issues. The task of the national courts under these circumstances is to
define the proper scope of their jurisdiction to affect parties and proceedings beyond those [instances] where their jurisdiction is unquestioned.
This can be accomplished partly by due regard to contractual choice offorum and
arbitration clauses which
seek princtoally to contain the litigational
39
sprawl(emphasis added).

Because different courts may be involved at different stages, it may
be difficult to envision strict application of the doctrine that only the law
of the seat of the arbitration becomes the law of the proceedings. 4 0 Furthermore, "the location of the arbitration may be fortuitous as simply
that place where the chosen arbitrator finds it most convenient to sit
.... )41 It seems clear, then, that "the search for the seat of the arbitration contributes little to a determination of the law of the proceedings in
'4 2
all but the relatively simple case."
A third point to keep in mind is that, on top of all these other complexities, the law of the proceedings may not be that of the same jurisdiction whose law governs the interpretation of the underlying contract.
Such a situation was presented inJames Miller & Partners,Ltd v. Whitworth
Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd.43 A Scottish firm contracted with an English firm on an English form contract for construction work at the English firm's Scotland plant. A subsequent dispute was arbitrated in
Scotland by a Scottish arbitrator under Scottish procedures. The English party invoked section 21 of the Arbitration Act4 4 to order the arbitrator to state the award in the form of a special case for the court's
decision on a point of law. A majority of the House of Lords found that
English law should govern the merits of the dispute, thus upholding the
right to have a case stated, even though the parties had chosen, through
their conduct, Scottish procedural law.
With such uncertainties concerning the law that will eventually govern an arbitration, one wonders whether the parties can reasonably expect their plans for the conduct of arbitrations under a contract to be
carried out. Hence, the purported advantages of arbitration over litigation-less cost and delay, more certainty in the law applied, greater
choice in the language used in the proceedings, less publicity, more flex38 Id. at 271.
39 Id.

40 Id. at 274.
41 Id. at 275.
Id.
43 [1970] A.C. 583, rev'g [19691 1 W.L.R. 337.
44 See note 3 supra.
42

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFORM RULES

ibility in procedure 4 5 -may be more theoretical than real. The most
carefully drafted arbitration agreement, combined with some good luck,
is often what is necessary to succeed in carrying out the parties' wishes for
an arbitration that will fit their needs. Reform in the law governing arbitration proceedings seems to be long overdue, in order to guarantee
more solidly the effectuation of the parties' plans and needs.
C

The Proper Law of the Contract

In the James Mller case discussed above, 4 6 the House of Lords acknowledged that the law governing the arbitration procedure could well
be different from that governing the merits of the dispute arising under
the contract, the "proper law of the contract.

'4 7

In International Tank,

48

the possibility arose that, although English law governed the contract,
the courts of other jurisdictions could supervise the arbitration at different stages of its proceedings. These cases indicate quite clearly the concept of the independence of the existence of the substantive law
49
governing the interpretation of the contract.
The well-known "choice of law clause" in an arbitration agreement 50 is a common way for the parties to select the law that will govern
disputes under their contract. They may choose the law of either of their
native countries, or they may select a third state's law. 5 1 However, this
selection is often done with little regard for the consequences of the decision. "At the proverbial handshake concluding negotiations, problems
are given the back of the hand," 52 and parties assume that in the event
their disputes do go to arbitration, there will be no obstacle to the appli53
cation of their choice of law.

45
46
47
48
49

See Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1 91-95.
See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
[1970] A.C. at 587.
[1975] 1 QB. 224.
More difficult to conceptualize is the independent existence of the law of the proceed-

ings, discussed in detail in Smedresman, supra note 4, 265-91.
50 E.g., "[AIll disputes going to arbitration under this agreement shall be settled according
to the laws of___
51 They may choose the third state's law to secure the benefit of a "neutral" system of law
or to benefit from the better developed rules of a strong system. Cited in Wilner, supra note 5, at
669, Cohn, The Objectivist Practice on the Proper Law of Contract, 6 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 373, 389
(1957).
52 Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1191.
53 In McClelland, InternationalArbitration. A PracticalGuide to the System for the Litigation of
TransnationalCommercialDisputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, the problem is said to originate in part
from the habits of counsel:
Most arbitration clauses are drafted by commercial lawyers whose skills are in
contract negotiation rather than litigation. As a result, the emphasis is generally
on the enforceability of the contract rather than the effectiveness of the arbitration clause. A commercial lawyer may insert a standard "boiler plate" provision
for arbitration in every contract he drafts, with some variations depending on the
amount of negotiation demanded on this issue. Although the contract may be
enforceable, all too often little thought is given by the practitioner to the utility of
the elements of the arbitration agreement.
Id. at 739-40.
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Parties sometimes think that making a choice of law is simpler than
defining the arbitrator's authority in their agreement, but the consequences of their choice may prove to be far more complex than anticipated. The conflict of laws rules of the law chosen may require the
application of another system's law, or the chosen system's law may be
too foreign to be applied in the forum of the arbitration. 54 One writer
cautions against using a choice of law clause at all because the chosen
law, even if applicable, may require the observance of vague trade practices or set up arbitrary rules such as the number of days a buyer has to
inspect goods to keep his right of rejection. 55 Choice of law clauses also
may reduce the speed and efficiency of an arbitration, hence raising its
costs as well as increasing the likelihood that the ensuing award will be
set aside because the arbitrator erred in his or her interpretation of the
chosen law. 56 Other difficulties include a choice of law that invalidates
57
part or all of the contract or the making of inconsistent choices.
Of course, if sufficient expertise can acquaint the parties with all
relevant aspects of the chosen forum's law, a choice of law clause governing procedural and substantive matters can avoid being subject to
these problems. When that is the case, a choice of law clause provides just
the kind of certainty and efficiency that is needed in international commerce. When such expertise is not available, other alternatives should be
explored.
D.

Conhflcts Laws

The conflicts laws applied to an arbitration are tied up with the law
of the proceedings and the substantive law of the contract inasmuch as
they will determine which law of the proceedings and which substantive
law will actually govern. Separate treatment is given conflicts laws here,
however, to aid in the analysis of the whole picture of law affecting the
arbitration.
In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code allows the parties to choose the law of a state or nation that "bears a reasonable relation" to the transaction. 58 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws provides that in the absence of effective choice by the parties, "the
rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
59
has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties"
under certain stated principles.
English conflicts law has been analyzed as being concerned with the
54 Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1209-10.

55 Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1210-11.
57 Comment, Choice ofLawfor lnternaionalContracts: An Ameran Critique, 2 TEX. INT'L L. J.
227, 232-33 (1960).
58 u.c.c. § 1-105(1) (1972).
56

59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971).
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' ' 60
as well
"intention of the parties, ascertained objectively and judicially,
as the points of contact between the contract and a system of objective
substantive law. 6 1 France has been said to follow something close to the
English "objectivist" view, looking, in the absence of the express intention of the parties, at the nature of the agreement and the circumstances
62
of the case.
A well-stated summary of the state of conflicts rules, at least in these
three jurisdictions, concludes:
There seems to be little doubt that, in the United States and in
England, despite an explicit choice of law by the parties, the conflicts
rules of the forum . . . will determine the effect of the choice made. A
close analysis of the French cases seems to reveal that a reference of some
sort has been made to French law before the choice is given effect. Thus,

there seems no way to free the parties' choice of lawfrom undergoing the scrutiny of
theforum's con/kcts rules.

If the confltcts rules of the system of law chosen are applied, rather
than its substantive law, the result will be just that uncertainty which the

autonomy of wills theory attempts to resolve. If the parties mean that
the choice of law is in fact the choice of a law of the proceedings, more
than simply problems of performance will be involved.63 The underlying
system of law will become that chosen by the parties.

The morass of uncertainty created by the conflicts rules affecting
international commercial transactions seems almost inescapable under
the status quo. All the analysis that the human species is capable of performing 64 seems inadequate to draft arbitration agreements invulnerable
to this uncertainty. The fault, however, does not lie in the conflicts rules
themselves. They serve a substantial purpose in the jurisdictions in
which they were designed, and they no doubt developed in many cases
with the careful attention of the best legal minds. The problem comes
from their application to arbitration in the international market. National conflicts rules simply do not properly address themselves to international commerce, which depends for its development on an attitude of
international cooperation, and which can only suffer from a strict upholding of parochial values. At this point then, an analysis of the proper
nature of arbitration in transnational commercial transactions would be
most useful.
60 Wilner, supra note 5, at 664 (quoting Graveson, The ProperLaw of Commercial Contracts, in
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS I (Summer Institute on International

and Comparative Law, U. of Mich. Law School 1949)).
61 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 296-97.
62 Wilner, supra note 5, at 666 (citing Societe de Fourrures Revel v. Allouche, Cour de
Cassation, 6 juillet 1959, 48 REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PR. 708 (1959)).
63 Id. at 674.
64 Excellent work has been done in the field. See, e.g., American Critique, supra note 57;
Ehrenhaft, supra note 7; Lando, The Substantive Rules in the Conflict of Laws: Comparative Comments

from the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 505 (1976); Smedresman, supra note 4; Wilner, supra
note 5.
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The Proper Nature of International Commercial Arbitration
A.

The United Nations Convention and the Public Poicy Defense

The United Nations Convention 65 is perhaps the most significant
development in the international legal community in modernizing the
law of international commercial transactions. Following two earlier international agreements dealing with the same subject, 66 the United Nations Convention provides for more certain and expedient recognization
and enforcement of arbitral awards sought to be validated in the ratify67
ing nations.
Article V of the Convention sets forth five conditions under which
recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused upon proof of
the conditions by the party against whom the award is invoked. 68 It also
sets out two conditions under which recognition and enforcement may be
refused by the enforcing authority under its own motion. 6 9 Criticisms

have been leveled at various provisions in Article V, and these should be
consulted for a fuller understanding of the article's "loopholes. ' 70 Discussion here is limited to the issues raised by the public policy defense
contained in Article V(2)(b), because that provision and its interpretations provide a basis for more fully understanding the nature of the arbitration process in the international arena.
Article V(2)(b) provides that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that "[tihe
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country. ' 7 1 Little debate occurred in the drafting of this
provision, and a decision not to add the phrase "or with fundamental
principles of the law" following the words "public policy" indicates that
"public policy" was intended to have a broad meaning. 72
It was initially thought that the provision would be a significant
65 See note 6 supra. For a varied treatment of the Convention see Achebe, The UnitedStates
Convention on the Recognition andEnforcement ofForeign ArbitralAwards ofJune 10,1958 Implications for
United States Investors in Nigeria, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 157 (1974); Comment, United Nations Foreign
Arbitral Awards Convention. United States Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67 (1971); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recogmtion and Enforcement ofForeign
ArbitralAwards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
66 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157; Geneva

Convention of Sept. 26, 1927, on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
67 The weaknesses of the earlier agreements are discussed in Evans & Ellis, supra note 13,
at 52-53.

68 United Nations Convention, supra note 6, art. V(1)(a)-(e).
69 Id. art. V(2)(a), (b).
70 See, e.g., Smedresman, supra note 4, at 326-28, who states that art. V(i)(a) of the Convention "may lead to fortuitous results as well as encourage forum shopping" Id at 327; Evans
& Ellis, supra note 13, at 55, saying the Convention's "system is exposed to the vagaries of law
among the states ....
"
71 See Quigley, supra note 65, at 1070.

72 Id. at 1070-71.
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obstacle to enforcement of arbitral awards,7 3 but now it is generally
agreed that the force of the provision has been considerably lessened due
to a series of decisions in U.S. courts interpreting the extent of the public
policy issue. 74 Regardless of what courts of the United States hold, however, the fact remains that countries which have not passed on the issue
may interpret "public policy" as broadly as they may see fit to further
their national interests. A better understanding of the scope of "public
policy" of a nation in the context of international commercial transactions may dictate a more limiting definition of the Convention's public
policy defense.
The leading case of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 75 is very useful in providing such an understanding. The respondent, a multinational U.S.
firm, purchased three firms incorporated in Germany and Liechtenstein
from the petitioner, a German national. Negotiations on the contract
occurred in the United States, Germany, and England; the contract was
signed in Austria; and Switzerland was the site of the closing. The agreement warranted that Scherk's trademarks were unencumbered. A
shortage in the inventory of those trademarks was later discovered, but
Scherk would not accept Alberto-Culver's offer to rescind the agreement.
Alberto-Culver sought to avoid an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
by alleging that the warranties concerning the trademarks violated the
76
antifraud provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
A previous case 77 had held that an agreement to arbitrate disputes
under a contract to purchase securities is unenforceable under section
1478 of the 1933 Securities Act, which was interpreted to void agreements
precluding access to the federal courts. The United States Supreme
Court found the earlier case inapplicable in Scherk, because the facts portrayed an international scenario which demanded different treatment.
The Court noted that the contract was concerned with the sale of corporations "organized under the laws of and primarily situated in European
countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets."'79 Furthermore, the Court said, "we cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
73 See Wilner, supra note 5, at 668. "The factor of public policy ... is probably the
strongest impediment to more widespread enforcement [of arbitral award]." Id. Even now, it is
seen as "likely to be the battleground on which the conflict over party autonomy for procedural
law will be waged." Smedresman, supra note 4, at 278.
74 See Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1199-1200; Comment, The Pubic Polc Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 228 (1977); Note, Judicial
Interpretations of Foreign Arbitral Awards under the U.N. Convention, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 737

(1976).
75 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
76 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1979).
77 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
78 Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
79 417 U.S. at 515.
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our terms, governed by our laws and resolved in our courts."' 0 Thus, the
public policy of taking domestic disputes under the securities laws to litigation was insufficiently strong in Scherk to require parties to go to court
over similar disputes arising in international commerce.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed this principle with strong language:
To read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's
utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of "public policy." Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's

framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational emphasis.1l
The doctrine emerging from these cases indicates that principles of
domestic policy and political practice ought not to interfere with the activity of international commerce. Indeed, this sphere of international
commerce may have its own "public policy," the support of which may
be in the best interests of the separate nations. It is perhaps for this reason that it has been suggested that arbitrators, because they are not required to effectuate the interests of any nation, are in a better position
than national courts to determine which nation's public law ought to
apply, and if not, then they ought to be free "to articulate notions of
policy relevant to the practice of international trade and commerce
"82

Although this is an excellent suggestion, its attainment will be precluded as long as rigid laws concerning conflicts and arbitral procedure
prevent contracting parties from choosing the governing substantive and
procedural law, or from choosing to keep their arbitrations free from the
strictures of domestic legal systems. The status quo probably will be perpetuated so long as a more progressive attitude toward international
commercial arbitration is not reflected in the language of such agreements as the United Nations Convention.
Indeed, the basic characteristics of arbitration-its emphasis on voluntary choice, its potential of yielding relatively rapid and inexpensive
resolution of disputes, and its flexibility to work under different procedures--demand that courts have a hands-off attitude toward the conduct
of arbitrations when the parties have freely and clearly spoken as to how
they want their arbitrations run. To a large extent, this attitude is prevalent. But, changes are nevertheless in order.
[T]he fact remains that the only way by which arbitration will be freed
from the conflicts rules of the law of the proceedings is through interna80 Id. at 519, (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (197 1)(upholding an agreement that the contracting parties would litigate their disputes in a foreign country
having no connection with the underlying contract)).
81 Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
82 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 346.
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tional agreements. Such agreements must, of course, limit the ability of
the enforcing state to nullify the award. . . . The public policy knife of
the place of enforcement must be dulled, if not removed altogether. This
factor and others like it, inherent in national sovereignty, render ineffectual efforts to internationalize arbitration. The parties may submit to
the rules of the I.C.C., but eventually the I.C.C. itself must deliver the
take
arbitration to one of the existing systems of law whose rules will
83
control and which will thus become the law of the proceedings.

B.

Toward an Intemationa 'y Accepted Law of Arbitration

Article V(1)(d) of the United Nations Convention embodies the
principle of autonomy of wills when it allows a court to refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral award if the procedure followed "was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties." In requesting that the
Convention be held, the ICC84 envisioned an award of an internationally
accepted character-"one from the multiplicity of national formal and
procedural requirements, and based entirely on the principle of autonomy of the wills of the parties."8 5 It is clear from the foregoing that this
character of international arbitral awards has not6 yet emerged, and there
8
are those who would prefer that it never does.
One scholar has suggested that in practical terms, an arbitration law
of international character has already begun to develop, one in which
arbitrators avoid choice of law questions completely by relying on general principles of international commercial transactions, along with a
perhaps unspoken reliance on trade usage and customs. 87 This creates
no cause for alarm so long as decisions are carefully reasoned, in that the
success of arbitration indicates that "arbitral panels have assumed the
role of equity courts of international trade, dispensing a form of justice
more closely attuned to the needs of businessmen than that which ordinary litigation is believed to supply." 88
Another writer suggests that wise parties will seek to have their arbitrators act in such a fashion. He suggests that they stipulate in their
arbitration clause that arbitration of disputes arising from their contract
Wilner, supra note 5, at 686-87 (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the background of the Convention, see Quigley, supra note 65, at
1059-60.
85 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 275 (citing Carabiber, Condithons of Deveopment of Intenational Commercial Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 149, 155-56 (Domke ed.
1958)). See also Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1219: "[o]ne of the primary objectives of the U.N.
83
84

Arbitration Convention was to give arbitral awards an independent status in law, thereby re-

moving many of the obstacles that previously had confounded parties seeking to enforce
awards." (Footnotes omitted).
86 See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 1, at 162.

87 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 299. Cohn, supra note 1, at 162, disagrees with this notion:
"[t]he arbitrators cannot determine the law which is applicable unless they make use of a legal

system containing precise and specific rules on the choice of law problem. To refer them to the
Igenerally recognized rules of private international law' means giving them stones in lieu of
bread."
88 Smedresman, supra note 4, at 300.
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will not be resolved by strict applications of substantive bodies of law.8 9
One reason for doing this, in addition to the advantages of avoiding the
pitfalls of conflict of laws rules, is that the contract itself is sufficient to
resolve disputes. It normally sets out a substantive "law" to govern resolution of the dispute by detailing the rights and duties of the parties and
telling what constitutes performance and what excuses nonperform9
ance. 0
It may well be, as these writers suggest, that an equitable approach
to resolution of disputes under arbitration is the better practice and is the
practice that in fact is most often applied. The problem remains, however, that recourse to such an approach, or any other approach chosen by
the parties for that matter, must be guaranteed support from the courts
in order to be completely successful. This will not occur until the international community agrees to a stronger policy of recognition of arbitral
awards.
Agreements and drafts on arbitration involving the international
community are rather common. The United Nations Convention is one
example. Others include the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of 1961,9 ' the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
93
States,92 the 1964 Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
and UNCITRAL's 1977 Draft Convention on the International Sale of
Goods. 94 Another agreement completing the job begun by the United
Nations Convention seems to be in order now. It is to this point that this
analysis now turns.
V. A New International Legal Regime Concerning Arbitral
Procedure And the Recognition And Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards
A.

Theoy

Three theories of arbitration have been advanced: (1) that arbitration arises from private contract and thus is essentially a private proceeding that ought to be free from the strictures of external legal systems; (2)
that arbitration is essentially a judicial proceeding subject to the legal
rules of the place of the arbitration; and (3) that arbitration has characteristics of both the other theories, with only some of its elements being
Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1211-12.
9 Id.
89

91 See Wilner, supra note 5, at 685-87.

92 March 18, 1965, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
93 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, done July 1,
1964, [1972] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (md. 5029), with Annex 1, Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods, reprnted in13 AM. J. COMP. L. 453 (1964).
94 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
Its Tenth Session (New York, 23 May - 17 June 1977), 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 42, U.N.
Doc. A/32/17. See Comment, United Nations Commission on Internattinal Trade Law. Wll a Uni/orm
Law in InternationalSales Finally Emerge? 9 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 157 (1979).
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contractual. 95 The third theory is clearly the prevalent view and is the
source of the problem discussed herein. It is all too often a difficult task
to guarantee that certain elements of the arbitration will be treated as
"contractual" by the courts. Because clear guidelines are not always
available to tell contracting parties which aspects of future arbitrations
are subject to legal strictures and which aspects are open to negotiation,
some guesses have to be made. There is no reason that this situation has
to continue.
With greater emphasis on the theory that arbitration is essentially a
private process which follows an agreed-upon procedure to interpret the
scope of the rights set out in an agreed-upon contract, international commercial arbitration has a much greater chance to live up to its full potential. Many nations have been reluctant during the development of
international commercial arbitration to give contracting parties a completely free rein in the structuring of their arbitrations due to certain
fears of loss of control over various types of conduct. The policy of
preventing "judicial ouster" of jurisdiction has largely subsided, 96 but
public policy concerns about litigating the complex issues involved in
such matters as anti-trust and patent cases threaten the validity of arbitral awards rendered in arbitration touching on these matters.
Hanes Corporationv. Millard97 is an interesting case in point, recently
decided in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The French assignors of an expired U.S. patent invoked arbitration with
the ICC to collect unpaid royalties due under the assignment contract
from their assignee, Hanes Corporation. Hanes sought a declaratory
judgment on two issues: that the patent did not cover the products for
which royalties were sought, and that a U.S. statute of limitations barred
the assignors' claims. The court of appeals reversed the district court by
holding that the statute of limitations question was contractual in nature
and, thus, subject to arbitration.
The court took a different view of the question involving the patent.
It was reticent to allow an arbitration panel to pass on "complex and
difficult questions in applying an extremely technical body of law ...
[T~he expertise of arbitrators has always lain in resolving, perhaps by
way of compromise, contractual disputes rather than in interpreting the
import of complicated federal legislation." 98 One analysis of this case 99
compares it with the Scher/' 00 case, discussed above, in that both cases
dealt with the conflict between international arbitration and a U.S. pol95 Sauser-Hall, L arbitrage endroit internationalfprivi,44 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 416, 469 (Vienna 1952), cited in Wilner, supra note 5, at 651.

96 Courts in England still may not be ousted of jurisdiction to determine questions of law
by arbitration. 1 SANDER, supra note 13, at 67-69, cited in Evans & Ellis, supra note 13, at 30.
97 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
98 Id. at 593.
99

Smedresman, supra note 4, at 340-41.

100Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 50 (1974). See text accompanying notes 75-80
supra.
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icy of confining disputes involving federal legislation to U.S. courts: o
The claims in Hanes were primarily contractual ones incidentally involving the scope of the underlying patent. The court need not have been
drawn into the case law involving arbitrability of patent validity; instead
a Scherk-type analysis of the contracts that the dispute has with the jurisdictions involved would have been more appropriate. Hanes demonstrates how arbitrability restrictions permit United States parties to race
with pleadings which frame the case around
into United States courts
10 2
nonarbitrable issues.
This discussion is extremely persuasive and makes it clear that, as in
the case of the "ordinary" international commercial contract, the public
policy defense should not prevail in cases of international commercial
contracts involved issues of complex legislation. To be effective, then, an
international legal system governing the effectuation of commercial arbitration need do little to restrict complete autonomy of wills.
B

Basic Structure

The best means of bringing about the reforms advocated here is an
international convention subscribing to a law of the proceedings that the
participating nations agree to apply to the recognition and enforcement
of arbitrations involving a foreign national party. Parties should be free
to choose a domestic law of the proceedings, but since parties often neglect to make a choice of law regarding either procedure of substance in
an arbitration, this new law of the proceedings should apply when no
specific choice is made. Furthermore, when no choice of substantive law
is made, this new convention should specify that the resolution of the
substantive issues be based on the contract language, the applicable usages and customs of trade, and what is equitable under the circumstances, including the accepted principles of international commercial
transactions.10 3 When a choice of substantive law is made, ratifying nations should be bound to honor the choice and be prevented from using
their conflicts rules to cause another jurisdiction's law to govern.
Nations ratifying this convention should agree to enforce its provisions regardless of whether the parties to the arbitration are nationals of
other ratifying nations; all that should be necessary is that the arbitration
proceed "under" the new convention. This means that the parties, nationals of different countries, did not stipulate to a choice of procedural
or substantive law, and the arbitration was held in a ratifying nation. Of
course, the parties may stipulate specifically that the new law apply.
Such a convention should operate to give greater judicial support to
the arbitration process than before. Arbitration agreements freely en10 4
tered into ought to be specifically enforceable in all ratifying nations,
101

Smedresman, supra note 4, at 341.

102 Id
103 St Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 1211; Smedresman, supra note 4, at 300. See also text
accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
104 Under the United States Arbitration Act, supra note 10, § 4, aggrieved parties may
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and principles of comity ought to require other nations, even if they have
not ratified the convention, to recognize orders for specific enforcement
issued elsewhere. The law ought to require the courts of ratifying nations
to stay proceedings in their courts when the dispute is "referable to arbitration" 10 5 under an agreement between the parties. Judicial intervention during the arbitration proceedings to determine the scope of the
arbitrator's power under the agreement or to determine the arbitrability
of the issues is a potential problem, but with the enactment of the provisions proposed here, the risk of the harm of this problem outweighing the
other benefits is minimal.
The core of this proposed convention is the automatic recognition
and enforcement by ratifying nations, and, it is hoped, by others as well,
of arbitral awards rendered in proceedings conducted pursuant to the
convention. The only exception should be a narrowly defined public policy consideration, one limited to protecting the litigation of matters of
extreme national interest that go far beyond matters merely contractual
in nature. 106
C

ProceduralRules

The proposed convention should also require the courts of ratifying
nations, upon petition, to order the carrying out of the elements of the
agreed procedure, whether it consists solely of the rules of an arbitration
association, a tailor-made procedure, or a combination of institutional
and party-drafted rules. As discussed earlier, however,1 0 7 institutional
rules are severely lacking, requiring the parties to spend valuable time
during contract negotiation setting out detailed arbitration procedures if
they wish to be assured that a hearing will be conducted in a manner
they consider fair.
Thus, the internationally accepted law of the proceedings being advocated here cannot succeed in its objective unless parties can routinely
call on an arbitration procedure that is also internationally accepted.
The UNCITRAL rules seem best designed for this type of expansion; it
thus is recommended that they be redrafted to set out a clear arbitration
procedure from beginning to end.
This does not mean that the rules must set out a strict format approaching court room formality. This conceivably could be self-defeating. But certain basics must be addressed. The rules must set out a
generally accepted order of proof for the parties to follow; they must set
out certain rights in a hearing, e.g., the right of cross-examination or impeachment; they must set forth some kind of policy on the presentation
petition a United States court for an order directing arbitration when the arbitration agreement
provides for arbitration in the domain of the court's jurisdiction.
105 Cf United States Arbitration Act, supra note 10, § 3.
106 &e Smedresman, supra note 4, at 340. See also text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
107 See discussion in Section II(A) supra.
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of evidence, e.g., that strict evidentiary rules will not be followed, but
that evidence must be reliable and relevant; and they must set out some
kind of policy on the use of substantive law that is acceptable to the
international legal community under current views of international arbitration.' 08 Additionally, these rules should set out strict timetables for
each step in the proceeding in order to ensure that each arbitration will
move swiftly to conclusion.
D.

Implemenlation

The drafting of this new legal regime will best be done in a United
Nations conference such as the one which drafted the United Nations
Convention.10 9 The success of that Convention attests to the receptivity
of the nations to international documents drafted within that institution,
at least on this subject matter. Although perhaps a bit slow in its first
years to pick up some of its most important present adherents, the
United Nations Convention has now been ratified by the major trading
nations, including the United States,' 0 Great Britain, I I and almost all
socialist countries, 1 2 whose domestic systems of arbitration differ signifi13
cantly from those in western Europe and the United States."
The new convention could be viewed as amendatory to the earlier
United Nations Convention, having the purpose of completing the job
begun by it. Now that the bold steps it has taken have proved to be in
the right direction, international cooperation in continuing the progress
that that convention made should be substantial.
VI.

Conclusion

The process of arbitration has made the business of carrying on the
activity of transnational commercial transactions infinitely easier. Arbitration presents a potentially quick and low-cost alternative to the
drudgery, uncertainty, and expense of litigating transnational commercial disputes. The benefits of arbitration are significantly less when the
drawbacks of litigation are allowed to creep into the arbitration process.
This occurs when nations use their courts to interfere with what should
be, for the most part, a private procedure.
108 Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 9, requires the use of some jurisdiction's substantive law, chosen either by the parties or the arbitral tribunal,
unless the parties specify that the tribunal decide "as amiable compositeur." The
article requires the tribunal to consider the terms of the contract and the usages of
the trade in all cases. It could be that this policy, or one very much like it, is most
appropriate for the suggested new regime.
109 See note 6, supra.
110 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08

(1976)).
III Arbitration Act, 1975, c.3.

112 Of the socialist states, only the Peoples' Republic of China, Vietnam and Albania are
not parties to the Convention. See Orban, The Challenge to the Enforcement of Sociaht Arbitral
Awards, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 375, 378 (1977).
"13 Id.
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The abundance of rules and policies with respect to arbitration
among the commercial nations makes it exceedingly difficult for the legal
practitioner in international commercial transactions to draft arbitration
agreements that adequately protect clients' interests. All too often,
choice of law clauses are frustrated by complex conflict of laws rules, and
even when those clauses are effectuated, arbitrary rules of commercial
practice may unexpectedly alter the most careful of plans.
Parties to arbitration in the international commercial arena ought
to be more protected in their choice of the legal rules or equitable considerations that will resolve their disputes. Clearly, the only way to do this
is through international agreement. The legal regime set forth provides
the framework for a suggested answer to the problem. It proceeds on the
theory that international commercial arbitration has grown into a program that warrants its own legal protections, that is already governed to
some degree by its own doctrines of equity and fairness, and that it ought
not to be interfered with at all by individual nations, save in the most
extreme circumstances.
The citation of the numerous authorities in this article indicates that
these ideas are not original, nor are they particularly new. They are,
however, ideas demanding greater action than before. It is hoped that
this effort will spur some of that needed action.

